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CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: 
THE QUEST FOR A COHERENT POSITION 
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE 
The Ohio State University 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... 
This clause of the First Amendment, recently 
applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate 
certain religious practices in the public schools,' 
has called down a new storm over the Supreme 
Court. The storm has not consisted merely of 
the political bombast of predictable critics.2 
Rather, it has included Dean Griswold of the 
Harvard Law School who perceived in the first 
school prayer case an unyielding and unwar- 
ranted absolutism in the position of the Court.3 
It includes also highly regarded church figures, 
such as Episcopal Bishop Pike, who has called 
for a constitutional amendment to alter the 
Court's mandates.4 It has percolated within the 
law schools,5 and within the Court itself where 
1 School District v. Schempp, and Murray v. 
Curlett, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (1963); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
2 "They put the Negroes in the schools-now 
they put God out of the schools." Statement by 
G. W. Andrews, Representative from Alabama, 
New York Times, June 26, 1962, p. 1, col. 8. See 
also the remarks of Senators Eastland, Johnston, 
McClellan, Talmadge, Robertson, Stennis, and 
Beall, ibid., June 30, 1962, p. 20, cols. 2, 5, and 
sources cited in Kauper, "Prayer, Public Schools 
and the Supreme Court," University of Michigan 
Law Review, Vol. 61 (1963) p. 1031, n. 2; see also 
H.J.R. No. 21, a Joint Resolution adopted by the 
105th General Assembly of Ohio (1963), me- 
morializing the Ohio public school system "that 
daily prayer and Bible reading should be prac- 
ticed in the schools of Ohio." 
3 Griswold, "Absolute is in the Dark," Utah 
Law Review, Vol. 8 (1963), p. 167. 
4 New York Times, July 14, 1962, p. 9, col. 2; 
Reader's Digest, 78-85 (1962). For an excellent 
news treatment of the Engel case, see CBS 
Reports, Storm Over the Supreme Court, Part Two, 
originally telecast on March 13, 1963. Reprints 
are available from the CBS Television Network. 
6 See, e.g., Kauper, op. cit. supra; Choper, "Re- 
ligion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitu- 
tional Standard," University of Minnesota Law 
Review, Vol. 47 (1963), p. 329; Sutherland, "Es- 
tablishment According to Engel," Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 76 (1962), p. 25; Pfeffer, "Court, 
Constitution and Prayer," Rutgers Law Review, 
lengthy separate opinions were composed to 
clarify what has and what has not been done.6 
Yet, even within the Court, as within the larger 
academic and public forums, wide disagree- 
ment remains as to the applied meaning of the 
opaque language of the religion clause.7 
This article cannot quiet the storm over the 
Supreme Court, but it can make clear which 
parts of the storm are entitled to be taken seri- 
ously and which are merely bluster. Beyond 
this, there are more significant purposes to be 
served. The first of these is to make sense of 
existing cases in terms of some coherent doc- 
trine, responsive to the First Amendment and 
possessing substantial predictive value: to de- 
scribe the standard of church-state separation 
which the Supreme Court applies in fact. The 
second is to demonstrate that a number of open 
questions remain to be answered before a more 
precise boundary of church-state separation 
can be known. The third purpose of this article 
is to propose and to defend certain answers to 
Vol. 16 (1962), p. 735; Kurland, "The Regents' 
Prayer Case: Full of Sound and Fury Signify- 
ing . . . ," 1962 The Supreme Court Review, p. 1. 
6 In Engel v. Vitale, above, note 1, three opin- 
ions covering thirty pages appeared, with two 
members of the Court not participating in the 
decision. In School District v. Schempp, also 
above, note 1, four separate opinions spanning 
117 pages of United States Reports were in- 
volved. The multiple opinions in the Sunday 
Closing Law cases span 220 pages and reveal 
breaches within the Court felt again this year in 
the four separate opinions filed in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 298, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (1963). 
7 The disagreement is by no means confined to 
a split between the majority of eight and Mr. 
Justice Stewart who dissented. Mr. Justice 
Douglas apparently would apply the Establish- 
ment Clause whenever there is one cent of public 
funds involved. Mr. Justice Brennan would obvi- 
ously uphold a vast number of practices unaccept- 
able to Mr. Justice Douglas, and there are signifi- 
cant differences as well in the concepts of neu- 
trality in the opinions of Mr. Justice Clark, in 
relation to those by Justices Goldberg and 
Harlan. 
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the open questions, to provide the Court with a 
position which is both coherent and neutral. 
I 
A restatement of the Religion Clause to con- 
form to the Court's response to the First 
Amendment is not without its difficulties; the 
Court has never used that clause to invalidate a 
single federal statute, notwithstanding the 
many substantial connections which continue 
to be maintained between organized religion 
and the federal government. Certain surface 
inconsistencies, moreover, appear among the 
several cases upholding certain federal laws 
which confer conspicuous benefits on some 
religious groups.8 All of the decisions invalidat- 
ing laws because they either abridged the free 
exercise of religion, or tended to establish 
religion, have involved state laws only.9 And 
each of these decisions has relied upon an 
Amendment to the Constitution which itself 
makes no express mention of "religion" what- 
ever and provides only the following vague 
statement: 
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 
(1944); Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 
(1918); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); 
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457 (1891); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 219 
(1899); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
9 See e.g., the Schempp, Murray and Engel cases 
cited above, note I; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 
U.S. 488 (1961); McCollum v. School Board, 333 
U.S. 203 (1948), holding state laws invalid as an 
establishment of religion. Sherbert v. Verner, 
above, note 6; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 
(1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); 
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Mur- 
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); 
Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Jones 
v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Martin v. City of 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), holding state laws 
invalid as abridging the free exercise of religion. 
There has been a host of cases in which freedom of 
religion was involved, but where the decision was 
not in fact based on an "abridgment" theory. 
See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 
(1938); Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624 (1943); Cochran v. La. State Bd. of 
Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). For a superior dis- 
cussion of these and related cases, see Kurland, 
Religion and the Law (Chicago, 1962). 
In the process of interpreting this Amend- 
ment to make applicable against state govern- 
ment the full religion clause of the First 
Amendment, itself applicable only against 
Congress,"0 the Court has rejected a number of 
arguments still troublesome to the historically 
minded. Successively, the Court considered and 
disposed of the following contentions: (1) the 
due process clause, as part of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, was ratified in 1868 merely to 
extend additional constitutional protection to 
Negroes beyond what the Reconstruction Con- 
gress believed had already been accomplished 
in the Thirteenth Amendment, and had no 
purpose to limit government power outside the 
race zone; (2) the clause, as it says, is concerned 
only with the integrity of the process or means 
by which decisions affecting life, liberty, or 
property are made, i.e., that those means con- 
form with due process, and it has nothing to do 
with the substance of a legislative decision 
arrived at by an appropriate and reasonable 
procedure; (3) assuming there is a substantive 
due process aspect to the clause, however, an 
interest in religion is not within the kind of 
"liberty" contemplated; i.e., there was no in- 
corporation of the First Amendment's religion 
clause into the due process clause; (4) assuming 
there was some incorporation, still, since the 
due process clause speaks of "liberty," only 
that part of the First Amendment protecting 
religious liberty is made applicable to states, 
and the establishment clause is not applicable. 
Consequently, if a state law does not impair 
anyone's liberty to worship as he pleases; there 
can be no complaint if it merely promotes 
religion or subsidizes religious interests, even 
though such practices might constitute an 
establishment of religion under the First 
Amendment." 
10 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 
(1833); Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. 
(3 How.) 589 (1845). 
11 Historical analyses of the religion clause in 
the First Amendment, and of its application 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, include 
Healey, Jefferson on Religion in Public Educa- 
tion (1962); Murray, We Hold These Truths (New 
York; Shead and Ward, 1960); Howe, "The Con- 
stitutional Question," Religion and the Free So- 
ciety, Vol. 49 (1958); Brady, Confusion Twice 
Confounded (1954); Pfeffer, Church, State and 
Freedom (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1962) pp. 
124-33; O'Neill, Religion and Education Under 
the Constitution (New York, 1949); Corwin, The 
Supreme Court as a National School Board, A Con- 
stitution of Powers in a Secular State (1951); 
Stokes, Church and State in the United States, I, 
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It is familiar learning that all of these argu- 
ments have been rejected, and that the First 
Amendment is regarded as fully and equally 
applicable against the states. Similarly, the 
Court has rejected the argument that the 
establishment clause was intended only to 
require that government be neutral among 
religions, rather than detached from religion 
itself, i.e., that laws of benefit to religion are 
constitutional when the benefit is extended on 
a nonsectarian or nonpreferential basis suffi- 
cient to guard against establishing any one 
church as the state religion. The rejection of this 
and the preceding arguments has now become 
so consistent and so emphatic that there is no 
practical benefit in re-evaluating them once 
again. Since 1947, the Court has heard eleven 
cases involving challenges to state laws where 
the challenges were based on the establishment 
clause of the First Amendment.12 In nearly 
every case, the arguments summarized above 
were elaborately presented in behalf of the 
state. While only five of the eleven cases actu- 
ally went against the state in terms of the 
decision, in no case did the Court sustain a law 
537-61 (1950); Parsons, The First Freedom (1948); 
Bryce, The American Commonwealth (New York, 
1914), II, 763-95; Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States (Boston, 1865), 
III, ? 1865 et seq.; Murray, "Law or Preposses- 
sions?," Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 
14 (1959), p. 23; Katz, "Freedom of Religion and 
State Neutrality," University of Chicago Law 
Review, Vol. 20 (1953), p. 426; Pfeffer, "Church 
and State: Something Less than Separation," 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 19 (1951) 
p. 1; Lardner, "How Far Does the Constitu- 
tion Separate Church and State?," this REvIEw, 
Vol. 45 (1951), p. 110; Konvitz, "Separation of 
Church and State: The First Freedom," Law and 
Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14 (1949), p. 44; 
U.C.L.A. Law Review, Vol. 9 (1962), pp. 495, 
499. 
12 In addition to the five cases cited in note 9 
above, invalidating state laws establishing re- 
ligion, the Court has sustained laws against such 
a challenge in the following six cases: McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), (four cases con- 
solidated); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 
(1952); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 
1 (1947). In addition, two members of the Court 
invoked the establishment clause this year in 
Sherbert v. Verner, above, note 6, and there are 
other cases where the issue was not raised or not 
heard, e.g., Cochran v. La. State Bd. of Educa- 
tion, 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Doremus v. Board of 
Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
on the basis of any of the above arguments. 
That these arguments are no longer presentable 
in the Court is clear from the following abrupt 
statements from the majority opinion in this 
year's school prayer cases: 
First, this Court has decisively settled that the 
First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of reli- 
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has 
been made wholly applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the 
contention that the establishment clause forbids 
only governmental preference of one religion over 
another.13 
What the Court has done, instead, is to treat 
the two aspects of the religion clause as stating 
a single principle applicable to federal and 
state government. One aspect is the admonition 
that government may not act to burden the 
free exercise of religion. The other is that 
government may not act to benefit religion. 
The free exercise and establishment subclauses, 
taken together, are thus designed to commit 
government to a studied neutrality with re- 
spect to religion while government attempts to 
fulfill its numerous delegated, implied, and 
reserved secular responsibilities. Distilled 
13 School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
215-16 (1963). 
14 Id. at 226: "We have come to recognize 
through bitter experience that it is not within 
the power of government to invade that citadel, 
whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, 
to advance or retard. In the relationship between 
man and religion, the State is firmly committed 
to a position of neutrality." 
See also Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1, 52 (1947) (dissenting opinion by Mr. 
Justice Rutledge): "The sphere of religious ac- 
tivity, as distinguished from the secular intel- 
lectual liberties, has been given the two-fold 
protection and, as the state cannot forbid, neither 
can it perform or aid in performing the religious 
function. The dual prohibition makes that func- 
tion altogether private." 
Professor Kurland has attempted to synthesize 
the duality of the First Amendment in the fol- 
lowing terms (Religion and the Law [1962] pp. 
18, 112): "The freedom and separation clauses 
should be read as stating a single precept: the 
government cannot utilize religion as a standard 
for action or inaction because these clauses, read 
together as they should be, prohibit classification 
in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to 
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from the opinions of the Supreme Court, the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments may be 
read as providing: in the fulfillment of its proper 
functions, government should choose from among 
feasible alternatives, if any, those means which 
result in the least advantages and disadvantages 
to religion.'5 
The political objectives of the religion clause 
consequently include the following: 
1. to insulate governmental processes from 
distinctly religious controversy, by restricting 
the power of government in a manner which 
leaves religious and anti-religious organizations 
without special incentive or temptation to 
exert institutional pressures on those proc- 
esses.16 
2. to protect the private exercise of religious 
commitments from destruction, manipulation 
or seizure by the irreligious, by disabling 
government from acting with deliberate hostil- 
ity to religion; 
3. to avoid internecine strife among religions 
by disabling government from assisting or 
impose a burden." There are difficulties in the 
application of this particular statement, how- 
ever, and for that reason I have employed a 
slightly different statement in the text, infra. See 
Kauper, "Religion and the Law: A Review," 
Texas Law Review, Vol. 41 (1963), p. 467; Pfeffer, 
"Religion-Blind Government: A Review," Stan- 
ord Law Review, Vol. 15 (1963), p. 389. 
16 See School District v. Schempp, above, note 
1, at p. 222: "The test may be stated as follows: 
what are the purpose and the primary effect of 
the enactment? If either is the advancement or 
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds 
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by 
the Constitution." 
16 The concern to limit government from hav- 
ing powers which would provide a temptation for 
organized religions is evident from the dicta of 
the Court: "[T]he effect of the religious freedom 
amendment to our Constitution was to take every 
form of propagation of religion out of the realm 
of things which could directly or indirectly be 
made public business.... It was intended not 
only to keep the states' hands out of religion, 
but to keep religion's hands off the state, and, 
above all, to keep bitter religious controversy 
from getting control of public policy or the public 
purse." Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 
1, 26, (1947) (dissenting opinion). See also Mc- 
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961): 
"(T)he writings of Madison, who was the First 
Amendment's architect, demonstrate that the es- 
tablishment of a religion was equally feared be- 
cause of its tendencies to political tyranny and 
subversion of civil authority." 
harming any one or more religions more than 
others; 
4. to respect the integrity of non-believers by 
disabling government from lending its author- 
ity in behalf of religion.'7 
17 In view of the trappings of religiosity in 
public life, it is commonly supposed that the First 
Amendment is unconcerned with protecting 
atheists and agnostics. Such a view is comforted, 
no doubt, by certain congressional acts within the 
past decade. In 1954, "under God" was inserted 
into the pledge of allegiance. 36 U.S.C. ? 172 
(1958). In 1956, "In God We Trust" was adopted 
as the national motto by joint resolution. 70 
Stat. 732. In 1955, "In God We Trust," first 
authorized for imprinting on coins in 1865 (13 
Stat. 517, 518), was prescribed for all currency 
and coins. 69 Stat. 290. In 1952, Congress me- 
morialized the President to proclaim a National 
Day of Prayer each year. 36 U.S.C. ? 185. 
The lingering view that the First Amendment is 
merely neutral among religions also finds support 
in an unguarded dictum by Mr. Justice Douglas, 
the consequences of which were ably traced by 
Sorauf, "Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a 
Supreme Court Decision," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 
(1959), p. 777. The dictum, from Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952), was this: 
"We are a religious people whose institutions pre- 
suppose a Supreme Being. . . When the state 
encourages religious instruction or cooperates 
with religious authorities adjusting the schedule 
of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the 
best of our traditions." 
Compare with these, the following statements 
by the Court: Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 
495 (1961): "We repeat and again reaffirm that 
neither a State nor the Federal Government can 
constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief 
or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitu- 
tionally pass laws or impose requirements which 
aid all religions as against non-believers, and 
neither can aid those religions based on a belief 
in the existence of God as against those religions 
founded on different beliefs." Also, Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319, 325 (1952), (dis- 
senting opinions by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. 
Justice Jackson, respectively): "The spiritual 
mind of man has thus been free to believe, dis- 
believe, or doubt, without repression, great or 
small, by the heavy hand of government.... 
The day that this country ceases to be free for 
irreligion it will cease to be free for religion-ex- 
cept for the sect that can win political power." 
And Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 
15-16 (1947): "Neither [a state nor the federal 
government] can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an- 
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The operation of this standard in the eleven 
cases decided by the Court under the establish- 
ment clause may help to indicate its dimen- 
sions. In Everson v. Board of Education,'8 the 
Court reviewed an ordinance of a New Jersey 
township which provided for the reimburse- 
ment of the parents of public and parochial 
school children for the cost of bus transporta- 
tion to and from school. The average reimburse- 
ment was $40 per family each year. These pay- 
ments, made from public funds, were attacked 
on the grounds that they constituted a tax 
subsidy which relieved Catholic parents of 
costs they would otherwise have to meet from 
private sources and which allegedly constituted 
impermissible aid tending to establish religion. 
Writing for a majority of five, Mr. Justice 
Black conceded that the arrangement did in- 
volve a measure of "aid" to religion, but he 
declared the ordinance to be valid on the 
grounds that such aid was unavoidable and 
entirely incidental to the primary and independ- 
ent secular purposes of the ordinance, e.g., to 
promote safety in transportation, and the 
education and welfare of children. Since paro- 
chial school children were no less likely to en- 
counter traffic hazards than public school 
other. Neither can force nor influence a person to 
go to or to remain away from church against his 
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in 
any religion. No person can be punished for en- 
tertaining or professing religious beliefs or dis- 
beliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance." 
While no one may have "standing" to secure 
judicial review of Congress's religious obeisances, 
it is extremely difficult to reconcile the religious 
slogans enacted by Congress into law, with the 
following declaration by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465 (1961): 
"The Establishment Clause withdrew from the 
sphere of legitimate legislative concern and com- 
petence a specific, but comprehensive, area of 
human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the 
verity of some transcendental idea and man's ex- 
pression in action of that belief or disbelief. 
Congress may not make these matters, as such, 
the subject of legislation, nor, now, may any 
legislature in this country. Neither the National 
Government nor, under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may, by 
any device, support belief or the expression of be- 
lief for its own sake, whether from conviction of 
the truth of that belief, or from conviction that 
by the propagation of that belief the civil welfare 
of the State is served, or because a majority of its 
citizens, holding that belief, are offended when all 
do not hold it. 
18 Loc. cit. supra, note 12. 
children, and since the parochial schools' cur- 
ricula satisfied New Jersey's secular state 
standards of education, it was reasonable for a 
township to be as concerned with their general 
welfare as with the welfare of other school 
children, and to treat them equally. The anal- 
ogy was drawn to other municipal services: 
city policemen and firemen protect churches 
and their parishoners just as they protect de- 
partment stores and their customers. Since 
these are protected not because they are re- 
ligious, but solely because, their religion aside, 
they are otherwise simply members of a larger 
class whose welfare and protection is the proper 
concern of government, no violation of the 
establishment clause is involved. In terms of 
the standard offered above, the decision ap- 
pears defensible in these terms: It is a proper 
function of government to encourage education 
and to promote safety in the transportation of 
children. Recognizing that government cannot 
operate in a vacuum, i.e., with literally no 
effect on matters which incidentally assist or 
injure religious interests, those secular pur- 
poses may be fulfilled by public reimbursement 
of the costs of school transportation without 
violating the establishment clause. 
In McCollum v. Board of Education,9 a 
school board permitted various churches to 
conduct religious classes on school property 
and during the regular school day. Children not 
choosing to attend such a class were obliged to 
remain on campus, in a study hall. Noting that 
the arrangement benefited religion by provid- 
ing free facilities for religious indoctrination, 
and noting too that the program involved a 
measure of coercion on impressionable young- 
sters, the Court was obliged to determine 
whether these benefits, like those in Everson, 
were merely incidental to some secular purpose, 
or at least were no more than an unavoidable 
consequence of the fulfillment of some purpose 
otherwise within the power of government to 
promote. The released-time courses were not, 
however, courses about religion which might be 
defended simply as constituting part of a 
general liberal education.20 Since there was no 
primary and independent secular purpose being 
fulfilled through the released time program, the 
19 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
20 See School District v. Schempp, above, note 
1, at p. 225: "It certainly may be said that the 
Bible is worthy of study for its literary and his- 
toric qualities. Nothing we have said here in- 
dicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, 
when presented objectively as part of a secular 
program of education, may not be effected con- 
sistent with the First Amendment. 
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arrangement was invalidated as an unconstitu- 
tional establishment of religion.21 
The four Sunday Closing Law Cases22 sus- 
21 Analytically, the three school prayer cases 
are scarcely more difficult on the merits than 
McCollum. These cases severally involved a 
prayer composed by state officials and required to 
be recited by school children other than those 
excused on written request of their parents, and 
the recitation of the Lord's Prayer or the reading 
of sections from the Bible or Jewish scriptures, 
without comment, at the beginning of each school 
day. Here, too, participation was required by 
students not excused on written request of their 
parents, and the religious exercise was itself re- 
quired by state law or school board regulation. 
While markedly less financial aid was involved in 
these programs than in McCollum, since the time 
taken each day for prayers or bible reading con- 
sumed a bare moment or two, the arrangement 
still involved substantial aid to religion. Students 
doubtless felt some compulsion to participate, 
and the prestige of school authorities employed 
in a repetitious ritual and the authoritarian 
atmosphere of the schoolroom would influence 
many youngsters. The inculcation of religion as 
distinguished from teaching about religion in 
courses on literature or history, moreover, is 
clearly not among the "proper functions" of 
government. See discussion, notes 17-20, supra. 
Consequently, it is easy to appreciate the deci- 
sion of the Court holding these practices invalid 
under the test described above, even assuming 
the amount of aid to religion was relatively slight; 
such aid was not incidental to any primary or in- 
dependent secular purpose which would save the 
scheme. (The school board alleged, however, that 
the religious practices did serve independent 
secular purposes. This matter is considered 
infra, text, at n. 39. See also Choper, "Religion 
in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional 
Standard," Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 47 (1963) 
p. 329.) 
For similar reasons, the religious oath of office, 
considered in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 498 
(1961), was invalidated under the establishment 
clause. Maryland law required, as a condition of 
office, that notaries public subscribe to an oath 
affirming a belief in a Supreme Being. The coer- 
cion of such a religious expression, unsupported 
by any primary and independent secular purpose, 
resulted in a unanimous decision against its 
constitutionality. 
22 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961): 
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. 
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown 
Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961). 
tained state laws prohibiting commercial 
activity on Sunday, even where the law made 
no exception for Sabbatarians while exempting 
an odd collection of sales transactions relating 
to presumed emergency needs, recreation or 
works of charity. As in Everson, the Court did 
not deny that these laws conferred a benefit on 
religion by placing the power of government 
behind the strictly religious teaching of some 
Christian sects opposed to labor on the Lord's 
Day. Moreover, it conceded as well that in 
some cases at least, the impetus for such laws 
had been frankly religious in character, i.e., 
religious organizations had lobbied successfully 
for such statutes. Seemingly, such laws should 
be unconstitutional, as they violate the test and 
offend the political objective of the establish- 
ment clause to keep government from becom- 
ing the captive of organized religion. 
Nevertheless, the statutes were upheld in all 
four cases. As in Everson, the result turned on a 
finding that the supposed benefit to religion 
which flowed from these laws was merely 
incidental to a primary and independent secu- 
lar objective, properly within the police power 
of the state. These objectives were essentially 
like those furthered by a variety of laws pro- 
tecting the health and general welfare of work- 
ing people, e.g., minimum age and wage laws, 
maximum hours laws, collective bargaining 
laws, etc. It was equally consistent with the 
general welfare to set aside one day in seven, to 
assure each person an opportunity for psycho- 
logical and physical recuperation, to allow 
families and friends to come together, and 
generally to insulate the community from the 
hectic drudgery and raucous noise of the work 
week. The fact that the particular day set 
aside by law, Sunday, coincided with the 
religious preference of dominant organizations, 
was not enough to convert the law into an es- 
tablishment of religion: 
[I]t is equally true that the Establishment Clause 
does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct 
whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide 
or harmonize with the tenets of some or all re- 
ligions. In many instances, the Congress or state 
legislatures conclude that the general welfare of 
society, wholly apart from any religious consid- 
erations, demands such regulation.23 
The eleventh case, Zorach v. Clauson,24 de- 
cided in 1952, is a variant of the released-time 
program condemned in the McCollum case. 
The arrangement in Zorach differed principally 
in that: (1) no financial aid was involved be- 
23 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 442. 
24 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 871 
cause the religious classes were held off campus 
and no school personnel were involved; (2) less 
governmental sanction was placed behind the 
religious views presented in the off-campus 
classes, since the classes were not conducted 
under school auspices and the participating 
children would not regard the religious instruc- 
tor with the same submissiveness as they might 
their teacher within the regular classroom. 
Still, some evidence indicated that because 
non-participating students were required to 
remain in their classrooms, government did aid 
religion by subtly coercing student participa- 
tion. But even more critical, the Zorach 
arrangement showed no more of a substantial, 
or primary and independent secular purpose 
being served by the released-time program than 
in McCollum itself. Consequently, this case is 
often regarded as a departure from the stand- 
ard, and as an aberration not likely to be fol- 
lowed today.25 
25 It is arguable, however, that Zorach is de- 
fensible according to the standard, when one re- 
calls that the unitary precept of the First Amend- 
ment is that government should act neither to 
benefit nor to burden religion. If one focusses 
not exclusively on the released-time program, 
but on the net effect of government having em- 
barked on a compulsory education program, 
Zorach becomes more understandable in these 
terms: by enacting laws to require children to at- 
tend schools during most of the day, the state 
initially made it more difficult than before for 
those students to attend religious classes during 
those same days. By thereafter scheduling its own 
secular classes to accommodate those students 
who wished to attend religious classes off campus, 
the state merely acted to redress the balance, i.e., 
it restored to the students an opportunity to ex- 
ercise the religious freedom which they enjoyed 
before regular school attendance was required. 
To a large extent, however, this same argument 
was also involved in the school prayer cases where 
a Zorach rationale was rejected by a majority of 
eight members of the Court. The lone dissenting 
opinion, by Mr. Justice Stewart, argued that the 
compulsory school attendance law initially 
operated to make it more difficult for children to 
engage in the free exercise of religion, i.e., that it 
tended to abridge religious activities: "[A] com- 
pulsory state educational system so structures a 
child's life that if religious exercises are held to be 
an impermissible activity in schools, religion is 
placed at an artificial and state-created disad- 
vantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such 
exercises for those who want them is necessary if 
the schools are truly to be neutral in the matter of 
With the possible exception of Zorach, how- 
ever, all of the establishment cases are seem- 
ingly consistent with the standard of neutrality 
which we have derived from the Court's several 
opinions. Even so, there is widespread dis- 
agreement within the Court and among the 
commentators as to the constitutionality of a 
vast number of existing and proposed church- 
religion." School District v. Schempp, above, 
note 1, at p. 313. 
Nevertheless, more than "neutrality" was in- 
volved in the prayer cases. In the following re- 
spects, the program as it was administered did 
more than merely restore the opportunity children 
might have had to exercise religious prerogatives 
in the absence of any compulsory school attend- 
ance: (a) The prayer in Engel was obviously not 
of each student's or each family's private choos- 
ing, but was composed by state officials and was 
sectarian in character; it read as follows: "Al- 
mighty God, we acknowledge our dependence 
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, 
our parents, our teachers and our country." The 
Court has defined religion broadly, to include 
some nontheistic and many relatively small sects. 
See text at n. 32, infra. In this view, the Engel 
prayer becomes sectarian, e.g., the invocation of 
God is incompatible with nontheistic sects, an 
oral prayer is disliked by Quakers, the presumed 
value of prayer itself, describing the relationship 
between man and God as one of supplication and 
paternal response, and the use of a prayer to favor 
a particular country-all of these are variously 
offensive to a number of religions. (b) The prayer 
and scriptures in Schemnpp and Murray, while ob- 
viously not composed by the state, were pre- 
scribed by the state and were equally sectarian. 
(c) The excusal procedure, as noted by Mr. 
Justice Brennan, School District v. Schempp, 
supra, at pp. 288; itself tended to coerce students 
at least more than were there no school environ- 
ment. (d) Some tax funds contributed by people 
opposed to the prayers were involved in the 
salaries of the teachers and provision of the class- 
rooms, at least more than were there no school 
program, with each family being left to its own 
resources: id. at p. 229-30 (where appears the sep- 
arate opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas): "[T]he 
present regimes must fall under that clause for 
the additional reason that public funds, though 
small in amount, are being used to promote a 
religious exercise.... Such contributions may 
not be made by the State even in a minor degree 
without violating the Establishment Clause. It is 
not the amount of public funds expended; as this 
case illustrates, it is the use to which public funds 
are put that is controlling." (e) Conducting daily 
religious exercises in a classroom and under the 
direction of teachers provided an atmosphere in 
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state relationships.26 With respect to financial 
relationships, questions continue to arise con- 
cerning the tax exemptions accorded church 
property, parochial schools, the income of 
churches, and church supported and supporting 
enterprises, as well as the tax deductibility of 
contributions to religious organizations." 
which the students might well be more substan- 
tially influenced than would be the case if there 
were no school system, and religious instruction 
left to each family and church. On balance the 
prayer cases appear to have been decided cor- 
rectly. 
Not all of the aggravating elements of the 
prayer cases were present in Zorach, of course, 
and thus the case may still be as valid as Mr. 
Justice Brennan has recently suggested, id. at 
p. 262: "The deeper difference was that the 
McCollum program placed the religious instruc- 
tor in the public school classroom in precisely 
the position of authority held by the regular 
teachers of secular subjects, while the Zorach 
program did not." 
Nevertheless, the arrangement even in Zorach 
actually did more than restore opportunities for 
religious endeavors which young people would 
theoretically have had in the absence of com- 
pulsory school attendance laws, and for this rea- 
son, the case is of doubtful authority. If the pur- 
pose of the released time program was merely to 
allow students to follow their own, or their 
family's inclination to have them attend religious 
classes during the week at some church, that 
purpose would be adequately served by having 
the school release all students at certain specified 
times, leaving to each student and his parents the 
decision as to how that released time should be 
spent. In Zorach, however, those students not 
attending religious classes were obliged to remain 
in their regular classrooms, and careful records of 
released students were maintained to make cer- 
tain that they did attend the religious classes. 
The net effect of the program was consequently to 
ply a subtle coercion in favor of attendance at the 
religious classes, and not merely to provide stu- 
dents with the same freedom of choice they would 
have enjoyed had they all simply been dismissed 
from school on their own, or their family's recog- 
nizance. See the several dissenting opinions in 
Zorach v. Clauson, beginning at 343 U.S. 315. 
26 See n. 5, supra; Pfeffer, "Some Current Is- 
sues in Church and State," Western Reserve Law 
Review, Vol. 13 (1961), p. 9; Kauper, "Church and 
State: Cooperative Separation," Michigan Law 
Review, Vol. 60 (1961), p. 1; Kurland, Religion and 
the Law (1962). 
27 See Paulsen, "Preferment of Religious In- 
stitutions in Tax and Labor Legislation," Law 
Equally, the inclusion of parochial schools in a 
program of federal aid for education has raised 
questions,28 as has existing federal assistance to 
church-operated hospitals,29 the salaries of 
congressional and military chaplains, the cost 
of military chapels, and the federal "hot lunch" 
program which serves parochial as well as 
public schools. With respect to the regulatory 
authority of government, disagreement 
abounds as to the constitutionality of the con- 
scientious-objector exemption to the draft law, 
anti-contraceptive laws, Sunday closing laws, 
religious holidays, and the fragments of religios- 
ity in public life such as the use of the phrase 
"under God" in the pledge of allegiance, and 
"In God We Trust" in the national motto and 
on all U.S. currency.30 
These disagreements seem likely to continue, 
at least until the Court clarifies several particu- 
lar parts of the test. Certain hard questions 
have by no means been finally resolved. Prin- 
cipal among the unsettled ambiguities of the 
church-state standard of the First Amendment 
are these: 
and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14 (1949), p. 
144; Stimson, "The Exemption of Property From 
Taxation in the United States," Minnesota Law 
Review, Vol. 18 (1934), p. 411; Note, "Constitu- 
tionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion," 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 49 (1949), p. 968; 
Comment, "State Tax Exemptions and the Es- 
tablishment Clause," Stanford Law Review, Vol. 9 
(1957), p. 366. See also Arvo Van Alstyne, "Tax 
Exemption of Church Property," Ohio State Law 
Journal, Vol. 20 (1959), p. 461; Orinan, Religion, 
the Courts, and Public Policy (1903), pp. 1-38. 
28 Compare Butler and Scanlan, "Wall of Sep- 
aration-Judicial Gloss on the First Amend- 
ment," Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 37 (1962) p. 
288 with Pfeffer, "Federal Funds for Parochial 
Schools? No.," Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 37 
(1962), p. 309; Konvitz, "Separation of Church 
and State: The First Freedom," Law and Con- 
temporary Problems, Vol. 14 (1949), p. 44. 
29 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), 
sustaining such an arrangement. This case may 
also be pertinent to discussions of federal aid for 
education. 
30 Compare Kurland, Religion and the Law 
(1962), pp. 40-41 with Conklin, "Conscientious 
Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of 
Torcaso v. Watkins," Georgia Law Journal, Vol. 
51 (1963), p. 252. Compare the separate opinion 
of Mr. Justice Douglas, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421, 437 (1962) with the dissenting opinion by 
Mr. Justice Stewart at p. 444, and see the opinion 
by Mr. Justice Brennan in School District v. 
Schempp, supra, at pp. 296-304. 
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1. By what means are secular interests of 
government rationally distinguishable 
from religious interests which government 
may neither abridge nor establish? 
2. Assuming there is a tenable distinction, to 
what extent will the Court attempt to 
determine which among several inter- 
twined secular and religious objectives the 
legislature was primarily attempting to 
promote in fact? 
3. Assuming that a particular item of secular 
legislation also produces a significant 
advantage or disadvantage to religion, 
how feasible must alternative means of 
accomplishing the secular objective with- 
out the same effect on religion be, before 
the Court will hold that the availability of 
those alternative means operates to in- 
validate the particular scheme elected by 
a legislature? 
4. In determining whether religion has been 
burdened or benefited by a particular law, 
to what extent will the Court review re- 
lated laws to measure the net effect of the 
broader governmental activity? 
The remainder of this article will attempt to 
illustrate these problems and explore some 
suggestions which may be useful in their solu- 
tion. 
II 
Separating Secular from Religious Objectives." 
In Torcaso v. Watkins and School District v. 
Schempp, the Court observed that "religion" is 
not merely co-extensive with the systematic 
theologies of the most prominent religious 
organizations in American such as Protestant- 
ism, Catholicism, and Judaism. Rather, re- 
ligion includes the beliefs of at least eighty- 
three separate religious bodies with member- 
ships in the United States exceeding 50,000, 
including a number of nontheistic religions 
such as Ethical Culture and Secular Human- 
ism.32 The inclusion of these groups is, of 
course, unsurprising; it is easily argued that 
there are philosophic systems in the United 
States with far fewer than 50,000 adherents 
which are equally entitled to be recognized as 
31 "[TIhe line which separates the secular from 
the sectarian in American life is elusive." Mr. 
Justice Brennan, in School District v. Schempp, 
supra, at p. 231. For thoughtful consideration of 
this problem, see Kauper, "Church and State: 
Cooperative Separatism," Michigan Law Review, 
Vol. 60 (1961), p. 1, 22; Kauper, "Separation of 
Church and State-A Constitutional View," 
Catholic Lawyer, Vol. 9 (1963), pp. 32, 41. 
32 367 U.S. at 495 n. 11; 374 U.S. at 214. 
"religions" for constitutional purposes.33 Never- 
theless, even the limited breadth of the 
Supreme Court's definition creates a grave 
theoretical problem in the enforcement of the 
First Amendment, because the scope of reli- 
gious interest as thus defined frequently makes it 
nearly impossible to distinguish between re- 
ligious objectives which government is not 
supposed to establish or abridge, and secular 
objectives which it is free to accomplish by law. 
The reserved powers of the states, for in- 
stance, are frequently declared to include the 
power to promote the health, safety, morals 
and general welfare of the people. In the exer- 
cise of these powers, a variety of states have 
adopted anti-discrimination laws, anti-obseen- 
ity laws, anti-contraceptive laws, and Sunday 
closing laws. While some of these laws may find 
support among persons who claim they are not 
at all religious, many more people support and 
agitate for such legislation because they believe 
such laws to be religiously desirable. Mani- 
festly, to the extent that the states employ 
their powers to enact and to enforce these laws, 
they are necessarily tending to establish what 
is partly a religiously supported and supportive 
arrangement. That the arrangement may also 
have non-religious utility, in the sense that it is 
supported by some people not asserting a dis- 
tinctly religious interest in the matter, does not 
make the resulting law significantly less of an 
establishment of religion in public life. A hard- 
boiled theory of the Establishment Clause 
might suggest that all such laws are unconstitu- 
tional. 
Nevertheless, one is immediately repelled by 
this suggestion, if only because it would neces- 
sarily invalidate the great majority of all 
welfare legislation and virtually paralyze 
government from performing useful services in 
general. In fashioning a pragmatic response to 
this issue, the Supreme Court has generally 
defined "religion" in two different ways under 
the First Amendment. For purposes of the 
Establishment Clause, religion has pretty well 
33 Julian Huxley, for instance, while disbeliev- 
ing in a God, systematic theology, or even a gen- 
eral metaphysics, nevertheless describes his own 
commitment to evolutionary humanism as a 
religion. Huxley, Religion Without Revelation 
(1957), pp. 20, 194. For equally broad definitions 
by American philosphers and theologians, see 
James, Essays in Pragmatism (Castell ed., 1952), 
pp. 122-24; Dewey, Intelligence in the Modern 
World (Ratner ed. 1939), p. 1036; Tillich, "The 
Sum and Substance," University of Southern 
California Alumni Review, Vol. 44 (1963), pp. 
11, 13. 
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been confined to the preachments of organized 
groups-which groups may attempt to manipu- 
late the civil process to establish their own, 
distinct theology through the law or attempt to 
wrest benefits from the civil process which are 
of special concern to them and not shared by a 
cross-section of persons outside their particular 
church or band of churches. The laws requiring 
the saying of prayers or the reading of scrip- 
tures in class, for instance, are a clear example 
of distinct efforts at institutional religious 
aggrandizement, not primarily serving any 
needs or wants of others. More to the point, if 
the Court were to find such practices compat- 
ible with the Establishment Clause, such a 
finding would manifestly undercut the objec- 
tive of the Amendment to withdraw incentives 
from religious organizations to exert institu- 
tional pressures on the civil process. 
Where the legislation in question is not in 
fact the consequence of particular institutional- 
ized religious pressure, however, its coinciden- 
tal harmony with, and establishment of, re- 
ligious values will not be regarded as offensive 
to the Establishment Clause. The clearest 
statement of this position is found in Mr. 
Justice Warren's dictum in McGowan: 
[Tihe "Establishment" Clause does not ban fed- 
eral or state regulation of conduct whose reason 
or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize 
with the tenets of some or all religions. In many 
instances, the Congress or state legislatures con- 
clude that the general welfare of society, wholly 
apart from any religious considerations, demands 
such regulation. Thus for temporal purposes, 
murder is illegal. And the fact that this agrees 
with the dictates of the Judaeo-Christian religions 
while it may disagree with others does not invali- 
date the regulation. So too with the questions of 
adultery and polygamy. Davis v. Beason, 133 
U.S. 333; Reynolds v. United States, supra. The 
same could be said of theft, fraud, etc., because 
those offenses were also proscribed in the Deca- 
logue.34 
Intellectually, the Chief Justice doubtless over- 
stated the case in asserting that such legislation 
is adopted "wholly apart from any religious 
considerations," for some more or less privately 
held religious consideration probably underlies 
the value judgments held by the great majority 
of electors and legislators who created the 
law.35 Especially was this so in the very Sunday 
34McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 442. 
35 See n. 42, supra, and Mr. Justice Frank- 
furter, in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 
461 (1961): "Religious beliefs pervade, and re- 
ligious institutions have traditionally regulated, 
virtually all human activity." 
Closing Law Cases in which this statement 
appeared. Nevertheless, the practical effect of 
the Chief Justice's proffered distinction is 
probably the best compromise we can expect; 
it guards against militant church pressures 
while permitting laws which do not appear to 
be the particular result of such institutional 
pressure. This is not to assert, however, that 
laws which have some hypothetical value beyond 
serving the self-aggrandizing institutional in- 
terests of one or more churches are automatic- 
ally valid under the Establishment Clause, as 
the discussion in the following sections may 
indicate. It is only to assert that there is a 
clearer offense to the political objectives of the 
Clause when a given law results from, or 
tempts, institutional pressure from organized 
religion and does not merely coincide with 
matters of religious concern. 
Religion may be a more inclusive thing, how- 
ever, when the issue is whether freedom to 
exercise religion has been abridged rather than 
whether religion has been established. In this 
connection, the Court's suggestion that "re- 
ligion" is not merely co-extensive with the 
better established and more highly organized 
sects, may be taken more seriously. For while 
the primary (although not exclusive) concern 
of the Establishment Clause is to resist the 
importunities of distinctly institutional reli- 
gious pressures, the concern of the abridgment 
clause is to protect individual prerogatives of 
conscience,36 and not merely to protect the 
freedom of institutionalized religion or con- 
science. Saluting the flag, for instance, may not 
involve either marked assistance or harm to the 
vast majority of people or to a church as such, 
but the offense it gives to some who conscien- 
tiously oppose such a practice has been held 
sufficient that the flag salute cannot be com- 
pelled by law.37 
Even so, at some point individual assertions 
of conscience, absolutely sheltered by the 
abridgment clause, could equally frustrate any 
significant governmental activity just as a 
broad definition of religion would bar other 
36 School District v. Schempp, supra, at p. 222- 
23: "The Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws from 
the legislative power, state and federal, the 
exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of 
religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty 
in the individual by prohibiting any invasion 
thereof by civil authority." 
31 See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). As a 
technical matter, however, the majority opinion 
in Barnette was not based on an abridgment 
theory. 
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state action because it tended to establish 
religion. In the face of religious objections to 
medicine, for instance, laws requiring vaccina- 
tion against contagious diseases, or fluoridated 
water systems which all must use, constitute a 
measure of abridgment. In these matters, the 
Court may be expected to hold that where the 
governmental activity is broadly supported by 
democratically determined objectives which 
are not anti-religious by design and which 
cannot so feasibly be carried on without apply- 
ing to all persons, an incidental abridgment of 
some religious interests is constitutionally per- 
missible.38 Where the public purpose can be 
substantially served without discommoding 
personal religious interests, however, the 
abridgment clause may operate to shelter even 
the unorthodoxies of small minorities or single, 
unorganized individuals. Because the abridg- 
ment clause is more designed to protect the 
individual as well as the church from the state, 
while the establishment clause is more con- 
cerned with insulating the civil process from 
manipulation by organized religion, we may 
reasonably expect the Court to define "re- 
ligion" more broadly in the context of alleged 
abridgments. 
Distinguishing Actual Purposes from Ration- 
alized Purposes. Most of the laws reviewed by 
the Court under the Establishment Clause, 
and many still to be reviewed, produce a mul- 
tiplicity of effects. Some of these effects are 
clearly secular, according to common under- 
standing, and others are clearly religious. In 
Everson, as we have noted, one effect of the 
reimbursement plan was to encourage safe 
transportation and to reduce traffic hazards for 
children, something clearly within the com- 
petence of government to accomplish. At the 
same time, it was also true that another effect 
was to subsidize religious instruction, by re- 
lieving parents of the cost of transporting their 
children to parochial schools. In McGowan, as 
we have noted, one effect was to promote the 
general welfare by guaranteeing one day each 
week free from common labor. At the same 
time, the arrangement did throw the weight of 
government behind those religions that seek 
the observance of Sunday strictly for religious 
reasons. To a lesser extent, the prayer cases 
involved entwined secular and religious objec- 
tives; the use of prayers at the beginning of 
each school day was defended before the Court 
partly on the grounds that it served the follow- 
'8 See, e.g., The Selective Draft Law Cases, 
245 U.S. 366 (1918); Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 
U.S. 622 (1951). For a more questionable in- 
stance, see In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945). 
ing independent and salutary secular purposes: 
to foster harmony and tolerance among the 
pupils; to cause each individual pupil to con- 
strain his overt acts and consequently to con- 
form to accepted standards of behavior during 
his attendance at school; to enhance the 
authority of the teacher; and to inspire better 
discipline.39 Similarly, the pledge of allegiance 
arguably serves secular as well as religious 
purposes, e.g., to inculcate a spirit of national- 
ity, loyalty, and patriotism in the young, or 
"merely to recognize the historical fact that 
our Nation was believed to have been founded 
'under God.' "40 Federal aid proposals, inclu- 
sive of parochial schools, may be defended as 
promoting education to better the economy, 
education and defense of the country, or 
criticized as subsidizing the inculcation of re- 
ligion in parochial schools.4' 
Since the operation of these laws does pro- 
duce multiple effects, it is obvious that the 
constitutionality of a particular scheme may 
well depend upon the judicial characterization 
as to which of these is the predominant effect.42 
If the Court describes the law to emphasize 
only its secular objectives, suddenly the consti- 
tutional objection may virtually disappear. On 
the other hand, if the question is phrased to 
emphasize the effect on religion, the law in 
question is made to appear unconstitutional on 
its face. The selective use of legislative effects 
is manifest in the differing characterizations of 
the law in Everson. Mr. Justice Black viewed 
the law as though the township council had 
been solely concerned with the incidence of 
traffic accidents among school children, and 
had acted in response to a popular demand for 
municipal protection: 
[New Jersey'sI legislation, as applied, does no 
more than provide a general program to help 
parents get their children, regardless of their 
religion, safely and expeditiously to and from 
accredited schools.43 
39 See the Schempp case, supra, at pp. 223,278-79. 
40 Id. at 304. The argument is elaborated in 
Choper, "Religion in the Public Schools," Minne- 
sota Law Review, Vol. 47 (1963), pp. 329, 410. 
41 See articles in n. 28, supra. 
42 Kauper, "Church and State: Cooperative 
Separatism," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 60 
(1961), pp. 1, 35: "It is apparent that the solu- 
tion to some of these problems depends on plac- 
ing the right label on the legislative program, 
and that if we can label a particular program as 
social or child welfare rather than aid to religious 
education, we thereby determine the constitu- 
tional result." 
43 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 
18 (1947). 
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On the other hand, Mr. Justice Jackson de- 
scribed the township's reimbursement plan as 
though it had been adopted solely as a result of 
importunities by Catholics to obtain financial 
assistance: 
If we are to decide this case on the facts before us, 
our question is simply this: Is it constitutional 
to tax this complainant to pay the cost of carry- 
ing pupils to Church schools of one specified 
denomination?44 
Neither of these descriptions is wholly cor- 
rect or incorrect. Both, however, may be some- 
what disingenuous, and surely it cannot be 
determined merely by studying the face of the 
ordinance which effect was in fact the primary 
one as intended by the council which adopted it. If 
the constitutional requirement is that a law 
affecting religion cannot stand unless it is sup- 
ported by a primary and independent secular 
objective, it would seem imperative in situa- 
tions such as this for the Court to attempt to 
discover which among several objectives actu- 
ally provided the primary incentive for the law. 
If in fact the ordinance in Everson was merely 
the result of Catholic pressure for aid, for in- 
stance, the law would appear to be a product of 
the very kind of church-state collaboration 
which the First Amendment meant to dis- 
courage even if such collaboration is disguised 
as a "safety" law. 
It is sometimes exceedingly difficult for 
courts to determine legislative purpose, especi- 
ally in connection with state statutes enacted 
by legislatures which do not maintain a journal 
of debate or a record of committee hearings. 
The difficulty of the task should not be exagger- 
ated, however, and ought not be confused with 
a judicial search of legislative motives. The 
motives of legislators more commonly concern 
their personal reasons for acting, e.g., sym- 
pathy or hostility to religion, desires to be re- 
elected, etc., whereas their purpose in acting 
more substantially relates to the immediate 
objective to be accomplished by the law which 
is enacted.45 
It is to be hoped that the Court will not be- 
little the Establishment Clause by rationalizing 
primary secular purposes from the face of laws 
they are called on to review, and by neglecting 
the essential inquiry into legislative facts. At 
the same time this technique of judicial abdica- 
tion is available, and occasionally has been 
44Id. at 21. 
46 For an excellent discussion and reference to 
supporting cases, see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 
F.2d 594, 609-611 (5th Cir. 1959) (dissenting 
opinion), rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
used. In United States v. Kahriger,46 the Court 
sustained a federal statute which purported to 
be an exercise of the tax power applied to 
wagering transactions. But the legislative his- 
tory of the statute indicated that it was not 
designed so much to raise revenue, a proper tax 
purpose, as to suppress gambling and to assist 
local governments in prosecuting gamblers- 
purposes clearly not among the delegated 
powers of Congress. In dissent, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter took the legislative record into 
account and made the following observation 
which is equally relevant to the judicial review 
of church-state cases: 
[W]hen oblique use is made of the taxing power 
as to matters which substantively are not within 
the powers delegated to Congress, the Court can- 
not shut its eyes to what is obviously, because 
designedly, an attempt to control conduct which 
the Constitution left to the responsibility of the 
States, merely because Congress wrapped the 
legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue 
measure.47 
Similarly, in Barenblatt v. United States,48 the 
Court upheld the contempt conviction of a con- 
gressional committee witness who refused to 
answer questions which were logically relevant 
to a subject matter within the committee's in- 
vestigative competence. In dissent, however, 
Mr. Justice Black carefully reviewed the record 
of the committee and concluded that the 
actual purpose in asking the questions was 
merely to expose the witness to public ob- 
loquy.49 Since this was the primary purpose of 
the questions, and such a purpose was not a 
proper function for the government,50 he voted 
46 345 U.S. 22 (1953). 
47 Id. at 38. 
48 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
49 Id. at 153-66. For other cases in which the 
Court has deferred to Congress and has been 
satisfied with a mere rational nexus, see Howell, 
"Legislative Motive and Legislative Purpose in 
the Invalidation of a Civil Rights Statute," 
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 47 (1961), p. 439. 
60 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 
(1957): "There is no congressional power to ex- 
pose for the sake of exposure." See also Kilbourn 
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 
372 U.S. 539, 545, 567 (1963); Uphaus v. Wy- 
man, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959) (dissenting opinion). 
It is arguable, however, that while exposure is 
not a valid congressional purpose when the object 
of a legislative investigation is a private, volun- 
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to reverse the conviction. In Justice Black's 
view, it was not enough that the questions 
could serve a proper governmental objective, if 
in fact it (a) also served unconstitutional objec- 
tives and (b) the legislature's primary purpose 
was to accomplish the latter. The same thing 
can be said in reviewing legislation which ac- 
complishes a multiplicity of secular and 
religious objectives. 
There is reason to anticipate that the Court 
will make a more assiduous inquiry into legisla- 
tive purpose in future cases, at least where state 
laws are involved."1 In a number of the race 
cases, state laws which ostensibly served 
legitimate legislative objectives have been 
struck down when it became clear that they 
also served illegimate objectives which ac- 
tually inspired the legislation.52 Similarly, in 
the most recent school prayer cases, Mr. Jus- 
tice Brennan acknowledged that such prayers 
may have some secular effects wholly within 
the power of the state to promote, but he found 
that these, on closer examination, were not in- 
dependent effects nor in fact the primary pur- 
tary association, it may become so when the 
investigation is of a department of government. 
Additionally, it remains true that some purpose 
other than exposure nearly always can be ra- 
tionalized, and the dictum in Watkins has not yet 
become a holding if only for this reason: "The 
truth of the matter is that the balancing test, 
at least as applied to date, means that the Com- 
mittee may engage in any inquiry a majority of 
this Court happens to think could possibly be for 
a legitimate purpose whether that 'purpose' be 
the true reason for the inquiry or not. And under 
the tests of legitimacy that are used in this area, 
any first-year law school student worth his 
salt could construct a rationalization to justify 
almost any question put to any witness at any 
time." Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 
420-21 (1961) (dissenting opinion). 
51 It has been ably argued that greater judicial 
self-restraint is justified in reviewing federal, 
rather than state, laws. Wechsler, "The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the Na- 
tional Government," Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
54 (1954), p. 543. 
52 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 606-11 (5th Cir. 1949) 
(dissenting opinion), rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); 
St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 287 F.2d 
376 (5th Cir. 1961). 
pose of the prayer.53 Even in the Sunday Clos- 
ing Law Cases, the Court suggested that if the 
legislative history of such laws disclosed a 
primary religious inspiration for the enact- 
ment, rather than a general welfare purpose, 
such a law would offend the Establishment 
Clause: 
We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not 
be a violation of the "Establishment" Clause if it 
can be demonstrated that its purpose-evidenced 
either on the face of the legislation, in conjunc- 
tion with its legislative history, or in its operative 
effect-is to use the State's coercive power to aid 
religion.54 
It may be thought ironical that such an analysis 
may hold one law constitutional and another 
unconstitutional, when both operate in iden- 
tical fashions in two different communities. 
Nevertheless, if one of the purposes of the 
Establishment Clause is to discourage attempts 
by organized religion to manipulate the civil 
process, certainly it is necessary and appro- 
priate for the Court to determine whether such 
attempts accounted for the laws being re- 
viewed. Any other approach to the subject in- 
vites religious establishment in cellophane 
packages, and would frequently make it 
empirically impossible to determine whether 
there was any primary secular objective being 
served by the law. 
Alternative Means of Fulfilling Governmental 
Functions Without Pronounced Effects on Reli- 
gion. To illustrate the importance of this con- 
sideration, it is useful to consider the con- 
troversy over aid to education. At the outset, it 
is certainly clear that state governments fulfill 
a proper role by encouraging education through 
the enactment of attendance laws, the con- 
struction and operation of schools and uni- 
versities, and by providing a host of auxiliary 
services such as transportation, books, counsel- 
ling offices, recreation facilities, etc., as well as 
the basic paraphernalia of a school itself. 
Similarly, it is also virtually beyond question 
today that the federal government may assist 
and encourage these undertakings as it has in 
the historic grants of public lands, in providing 
National Defense, Fulbright, National In- 
stitute of Health and other scholarships, in 
providing research contracts which enable 
universities to add to their facilities, staff, and 
student bodies, etc. Virtually nothing in the 
current debate concerning aid to education 
53 School District v. Schempp, supra, at p. 280. 
See also the opinion for four members of the 
Court, by Mr. Justice Clark, at 224. 
54McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 453. 
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raises a constitutional question challenging the 
power of Congress to assist education in gen- 
eral, although some may doubt its political 
wisdom and many disagree as to how extensive, 
or in what manner, such assistance might best 
be provided. 
Granted that federal assistance to education 
would serve a proper governmental function, 
it might appear that the inclusion of parochial 
schools and colleges in such a program would 
not raise any serious constitutional issue either. 
For just as in Everson or the Sunday Closing 
Law Cases, any benefit which religious insti- 
tutions might derive from such a program 
could be defended as merely incidental to a 
primary and independent secular purpose, and 
so long as the legislative record disclosed that 
Congress's paramount interest was really to 
foster education, rather than primarily to 
promote religion, the arrangement would ap- 
pear to be valid. 
The Supreme Court has suggested, however, 
that the requirement of church-state separa- 
tion is not to be regarded so narrowly. It is not 
enough that a proper purpose was sincerely in- 
tended to be fulfilled by government, if that 
purpose could have been substantially fulfilled by 
other means which involve less effect on religion. 
The precept of the First Amendment is that 
government should attempt to promote the 
general welfare with the least effect on religion, 
and not merely that it should promote that 
welfare with but incidental, albeit substantial, 
effect on religion. Thus, in McGowan v. Mary- 
land, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: 
If the value to society of achieving the object of a 
particular regulation is demonstrably outweighed 
by the impediment to which the regulation sub- 
jects those whose religious practices are curtailed 
by it, or if the object sought by the regulation 
could with equal effect be achieved by alternative 
means which do not substantially impede those 
religious practices, the regulation cannot be sus- 
tained.55 
In the most recent school prayer cases, Mr. 
Justice Brennan made a similar observation: 
But the teaching of both Torcaso and the Sunday 
Law Cases is that government may not employ 
religious means to serve secular interests, how- 
ever legitimate they may be, at least without the 
clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will 
not suffice.5" 
The establishment issue in the proposals for 
federal aid to education consequently cannot 
66 Ibid. at p. 462. 
56 374 U.S. 203 (1963) at 265. (Emphasis added) 
be resolved simply by asserting that "educa- 
tion" is the proper concern of government, and 
that since parochial schools also meet the 
secular standards of states or accrediting 
associations, their inclusion would be con- 
stitutional. What the issue requires is a more 
careful examination of: (a) the particular form 
of aid which may be provided, to determine 
whether its use is substantially confined to 
secular purposes; and (b) the feasibility of 
providing that aid through alternative means 
which involve less of a subsidy to religious in- 
stitutions. Note, for instance, how differently 
the constitutional question might be answered 
depending upon which of the following types of 
federal aid proposals were adopted: 
1. Congress appropriates one billion dollars 
for "education", to be disbursed by the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Wel- 
fare to each college which may receive a 
total grant equivalent to $500 for each 
full time student. The money thus dis- 
bursed may be used according to each 
college's own determinations. 
2. Congress appropriates one billion dollars 
for "education," to be disbursed by the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Wel- 
fare, upon the application of colleges 
demonstrating a need and specific plans 
for the construction of laboratories to be 
used exclusively for teaching and research 
in chemistry, physics, or engineering. 
In the first case, a qualifying parochial college 
would be free to employ the funds thus granted 
to construct a chapel, to purchase additional 
copies of the Bible, in the teaching or subsidiz- 
ing of aspiring ministers and priests, etc. In 
the second case, the funds are restricted so 
that the benefits to religion are markedly re- 
duced. Such benefits are still conspicuous, 
however, in that the parochial college becomes 
more attractive to applicants by enjoying an 
enhanced physical plant, and private funds- 
from which the college otherwise derives its 
support-may now be released for wholly 
religious uses on campus. While the first case 
is almost clearly an instance of unconstitutional 
aid in view of the dicta of the Court, the second 
case appears arguable. A strict separatist 
might well argue that because parochial 
colleges account for only a small percentage of 
higher education, it is feasible for government 
to encourage education in the physical sciences 
in a substantial fashion by limiting its aid to 
public and nonparochial private colleges alone; 
since this is a feasible alternative means of 
carrying forward the primary secular objective 
without the same benefit to religion, the 
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Establishment Clause requires that this is the 
way it must be done if it is to be done at all. 
The difficulty is, however, that the Supreme 
Court itself has not vigorously pressed the 
alleged constitutional demand that govern- 
ment act to fulfill its proper functions with the 
least advantage or disadvantage to religion, 
and the issue of "alternative means" remains 
very much of an open question. 
In Braunfeld v. Brown,57 the Court upheld a 
Sunday closing law even though the law made 
no exception for businessmen whose religious 
scruples obliged them to close on Saturday. 
The law thus operated against Sabbatarians to 
coerce them to offend their religious belief by 
opening on Saturday, at the risk of losing two 
days of business by closing both on Saturday 
and Sunday. When the anti-religious effect of 
the law was defended on the basis that it 
nevertheless served a proper secular purpose of 
setting one day aside for rest each week, the 
plaintiff rejoined that this could be accom- 
plished equally well, without affecting his 
religion, by leaving the choice of the day to 
close to each entrepreneur. As a matter of 
fact, exceptions for Sabbatarians were already 
provided for in the majority of the thirty-four 
states having closing laws, and this was further 
evidence of their feasibility. Nevertheless, the 
Court rejected the sugestion and held that such 
an alternative means of effectuating the welfare 
policy of a closing law was not constitutionally 
required by the abridgment clause of the First 
Amendment.58 
The closing cases also raised the same issue 
under the Establishment Clause. It was 
pointed out that the selection of Sunday as the 
day to close was of greater benefit to the 
Christian sects which predominated in the 
state, than would be the selection of some 
more neutral and less religious day, such as 
360 U.S. 599 (1961). 
58 In holding that an alternative day need not 
constitutionally be provided for Sabbatarians, 
Chief Justice Warren indicated that such an ac- 
commodation would not be a feasible alternative 
because of: (1) added costs and administrative 
difficulties in policing; (2) the business advantage 
it might provide for those electing to close on a 
different day and to open Sunday when com- 
petitors were closed; (3) the difficulty of determin- 
ing the bona fides of those closing on a day other 
than Sunday; (4) the inability of family members 
and friends employed on Sunday to join with 
others not employed on Sunday; and (5) the 
general distraction from a day of uniform quiet 
and rest which some commercial activity might 
produce. 
Monday or Tuesday. If the purpose of closing 
legislation was simply to assure a uniform day 
of rest for all persons within the community, 
this purpose could be equally accomplished, 
with less benefit to religion, by choosing some 
day other than Sunday. Even so, the Court did 
not invalidate the Sunday closing law or re- 
quire that the state pursue its objective by the 
suggested alternative means. As a practical 
matter, the Court appears to reserve a large 
measure of discretion to the legislature, per- 
mitting it a good deal of latitude in selecting 
among means which carry more or less benefit 
or detriment to religion, while serving a primary 
secular purpose. 
Indeed, a rigorous application of the "alter- 
native means" idea might well have produced a 
different result in the Everson case, itself, the 
first case forthrightly to consider the Establish- 
ment Clause. If the purpose of the township 
was solely to promote safety in child trans- 
portation, and not also to assist parochial 
schools, that purpose might well have been 
served with less financial aid to the schools 
simply by enacting an ordinance requiring 
that school children be transported by regu- 
lated and licensed buses or automobiles. Since 
the state obviously has the power, and has 
often exercised it, to require that school build- 
ings meet minimum safety standards without 
reimbursing the schools for the cost of meeting 
those standards, it could certainly proceed in 
the same fashion in regard to transportation. 
Yet, the availability of this alternative in 
Everson was not enough to invalidate the re- 
imbursement plan adopted by the township, 
even though that plan obviously involved more 
of a benefit to the parochial schools by provid- 
ing a $40 a year reimbursement to parents. 
We have already observed that Zorach v. 
Clauson is also irreconcilable with a rigorous 
"alternative means" test: if the purpose in 
releasing children from school was merely to 
give them an opportunity to attend religious 
classes should they choose to do so, that pur- 
pose would have been adequately served 
simply by releasing all students at certain 
hours. It would not necessitate keeping non- 
participating students in school, keeping 
records of those who were released to make 
certain that they attended church classes, or 
otherwise lending the public school apparatus 
subtly to coerce young students to attend 
religious classes. 
With only eleven cases having been decided 
under the Establishment Clause, and with 
none dating farther back than 1947, it may 
not be surprising that the Court has not pressed 
an "alternative means" test. The fact that it 
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was employed in the school prayer cases, how- 
ever, and that it is now more frequently ob- 
served in the dicta of the Court,59 may in- 
dicate that it would be more useful in the 
future and that it is surely relevant to the 
controversy concerning federal aid to educa- 
tion. 
Measuring the Net Effect of Governmental 
Activity on Religion. As cases have reached the 
Supreme Court, the controversy as to whether 
a given governmental activity unconstitu- 
tionally aided or harmed religious interests 
has too often confined itself to limited facts. 
Rarely have the litigants or the Justices ex- 
amined the relation of those facts to other 
facts which may have occurred earlier to affect 
religious interests in one way or another. Yet, 
when the totality of related governmental 
transactions is considered, it may reasonably 
lead us to assess the net effect on religious in- 
terests differently than were we to concentrate 
only on one end of the transaction. This is 
especially clear when the governmental ac- 
tivity involves taxes and expenditures, but it 
may equally be so when the governmental ac- 
tivity involves a combination of regulations. 
In Everson, for instance, the occasion for 
litigation was the expenditure of public funds 
in such a way as immediately to make it 
cheaper and easier for students to attend 
religious schools. By focusing only on the 
expenditure of funds, all members of the Su- 
preme Court agreed that religion was "aided," 
and thus the issue was made to turn only on 
the question as to whether such aid was none- 
theless constitutional because it was merely 
incidental to a primary and independent 
secular purpose which could not be equally ful- 
filled by means less beneficial to religion. The 
funds expended by the township in Everson 
necessarily came from some tax source, how- 
ever, and the effect of the expenditure on re- 
ligion cannot reasonably be determined in fact 
unless the effect of the tax which makes the 
expenditure possible is also considered. 
If the expenditure came from an earmarked 
fund, the whole of which was derived exclu- 
sively from property taxes imposed on all 
real estate within the township, including the 
realty of churches, church schools, and of church 
members, it is clear enough that the raising of 
that fund initially operated as a burden to 
religion, i.e., it drained away some fiscal support 
which the church schools might have had in the 
absence of the tax. If the parents of parochial 
school children are subsequently included in a 
general reimbursement plan, the net effect of 
'9 See text at nn. 55, 56 supra. 
the whole tax-and-spend transaction is sub- 
stantially not one of "aid" to religion. Rather, 
it is substantially to restore financial support 
which was previously taken away by state 
action. In one sense, the net effect may even 
have placed religion at a slight disadvantage: 
had there been no tax in the first place, the 
additional money available to the church, freed 
from such taxes, could have been spent for 
exclusively religious purposes rather than for 
transportation. As it is, given these assumed 
facts, a court might well conclude that there 
was no establishment of religion because 
religion had received no substantial net ad- 
vantage from the whole governmental trans- 
action. 
On the other hand, if the public fund from 
which transportation reimbursement was made 
came from property taxes which were not levied 
on church property, nor the property of per- 
sons sending their children to parochial 
schools, it would be much more clear that the 
inclusion of parochial school parents in the 
reimbursement plan did result in a substantial 
net advantage for religion. As the Everson case 
was actually decided by the Court, however, no 
member of the Court raised any question as to 
the source of the funds. 
In reviewing proposals for federal aid to 
education, an effort to consider the whole 
transaction may also be helpful. The funds for 
such aid must probably come from taxes the 
great majority of which are imposed on per- 
sonal and corporate income in the United 
States. The Internal Revenue Code, however, 
exempts the income of churches, church schools, 
church supported and church supporting en- 
terprises from the income tax.60 Moreover, it 
also provides that contributions to religious 
enterprises are tax deductible.6' Since the free 
exercise of religion is not especially affected 
adversely by income taxes, the inclusion of 
church schools among the recipients of tax 
funds would constitute governmental activity 
resulting in a net benefit or advantage to those 
schools. It is true, of course, that tuition pay- 
ments to parochial schools are not currently 
tax deductible, and to this extent the income 
tax does operate to make it more expensive to 
attend a parochial school than would be the 
6? Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ?? 501 et seq. 
See also ? 107. 
61 Id. at ?170. For the estate tax advantages of 
religious bequests, see ?642. For ways in which 
the charitable gift can be used to maximum ad- 
vantage, see Lowndes, "Tax Advantages of 
Charitable Gifts," Virginia Law Review Vol. 46 
(1960), p. 394. 
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case if there were no tax, or if a deduction 
were allowed. On the other hand, the schools 
receive real and substantial indirect benefits 
from other governmental expenditures, simply 
as members of the national community, e.g., 
the general protection theyreceivefrom national 
defense. On balance, it would appear that tax 
accommodations already made in behalf of 
religion reinforce the argument that the in- 
clusion of parochial schools in a federal educa- 
tion program would tend to establish religion, 
in the sense of producing a clear net benefit. If 
existing tax accommodations were removed, 
however, such a program would be more con- 
stitutional in net effect. 
There is also reason to consider the total 
effect of governmental activity on religion, as 
well as the net effect of clearly related trans- 
actions as in the tax-and-spend situations. The 
gradual pervasion of American society by 
government has caused a number of religious 
organizations to fear that an unyielding 
"neutrality" in the First Amendment must in- 
evitably result in the gradual shrinking of 
organized religion. In a very real sense, there is 
cause for this alarm: not because the Establish- 
ment Clause itself expresses any hostility 
toward religion, but simply because the 
"neutralized" zone of governmental activity 
continues to expand, gradually squeezing 
religion from larger and larger areas of the 
total environment. 
From our previous discussion, it must surely 
be clear that distinctly religious practices and 
distinctly religious expenditures are forbidden 
to government by the requirement of the 
Establishment Clause. Distinctly religious 
practices or expenditures by private citizens 
and organizations, of course, are clearly not 
affected by the Establishment Clause and are 
theoretically protected by the abridgment 
clause. As government services expand, how- 
ever, and as more of the economy and environ- 
ment is occupied by the increasing, public, 
governmental sector of our society, the net 
effect of the shift is to confine religion to the 
ever shrinking domain of the relatively dimin- 
ishing private sector. This does not mean that 
the private sector has become smaller ab- 
solutely, of course, but that more rapid growth 
in the public sector has resulted in a relative 
displacement of some previously private ac- 
tivities. A hundred years ago, for instance, the 
vast majority of colleges and universities were 
private. Not being subject to the First or 
Fourteenth Amendment, these colleges could 
pervade their curricula with religious em- 
phases, as indeed many denominational col- 
leges did. Today, the majority of colleges and 
universities are state supported, subject to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and clearly not at 
liberty to engage in or to promote religious 
practices. We have witnessed a similar shift in 
secondary education as well, and the shift 
necessarily reduces the likelihood that the 
students who today spend more of their time 
within the public sector which is free of religious 
influences, will themselves become religious. 
What is true in education is equally true with 
respect to certain other parts of the total en- 
vironment. To finance expanding government 
services, the combination of local, state and 
federal taxes may gradually divert an in- 
creasing fraction of total personal income, 
necessarily leaving proportionately less money 
in the private sector to each person to spend 
according to his individual choice, in support 
of religion or other undertakings. To the extent 
that the tax revenues thus collected may not be 
spent by government to support religious 
enterprises, but must be used exclusively for 
secular purposes, the net effect, arguably, is to 
reduce the relative supply of funds available to 
religion.62 
None of this, to be sure, warrants the judicial 
junking of the establishment clause, or the 
abandonment of its salutary political ob- 
jectives. It may indicate, however, that the 
First Amendment ought not be regarded as al- 
together religion-blind, i.e., absolutely for- 
bidding government consciously to take reli- 
gion into account. It surely makes reasonable, 
for instance, an exemption from compulsory 
attendance laws for children enrolled in 
parochial schools, at least where these schools 
62 On the other hand, it is equally arguable that 
government fiscal activity, far from reducing dis- 
posable personal income, actually increases it. 
Funds taken in taxes are returned through the 
spending power to private hands which may then 
use the cash for religious or other purposes. And 
because of the enhanced multiplier effect which 
results from intelligent public expenditures, 
government fiscal policy obviously helps to gen- 
erate more disposable personal income wholly 
within the private sector of the economy itself. 
Occasionally, in protecting the "free exercise of 
religion," the Court has ignored the substantial 
affirmative effects of governmental fiscal activity 
and has concentrated unduly only on the im- 
mediate, negative, "proximate" effects. See, e.g., 
Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); 
Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). See also 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790 
(1963). 
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meet minimum standards of education.63 Simi- 
larly, it will justify Sabbatarian exceptions to 
Sunday Closing Laws, even if such an excep- 
tion may tend to provide the Sabbatarian with 
a slight economic advantage in being free to 
operate on a day during which some of his 
competitors may be closed. It may also sup- 
port, although it may not require, some tax 
accommodations which currently exist in many 
state and federal laws, even when the taxes 
raised from others may be used in public 
undertakings of indirect benefit to those who 
did not contribute, e.g., to provide streets, 
parks, police, and fire protection, and to gen- 
erate more disposable personal income.64 
3 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925), not decided, however, on the basis of the 
abridgment clause. See Kurland, Religion and the 
Law (1962), pp. 27-28. 
64 See Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 
(1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 
(1943); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 
(1943); Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). 
See also Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 
The neutrality of the First Amendment con- 
fronts difficult and unruly facts where it is 
frequently impossible for government to act 
without having some effect on religion, either 
tending to abridge its free exercise or to estab- 
lish it. Nevertheless, by carefully attending to 
the net effect of government activity, by giving 
attention to the real purpose of such activity 
when it produces multiple effects, by remain- 
ing sensitive to alternative means available to 
the civil process and obliging government to 
select those which impinge upon religion least, 
we may more nearly abide by the underlying 
objectives of the First Amendment. While 
nothing offered here automatically resolves all 
issues where religious and state interests over- 
lap or collide, the approach taken may at least 
avoid the simplistic dogmatism which fre- 
quently accompanies more facile treatments of 
the problem. 
Cal. 2d 644, 298 F.2d 1, appeal dismissed, sub 
nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 
(1956). 
